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Abstract
This paper develops a matching model in the director market with outside options
to explain the equilibrium board quality. Based on Hermalin (2005) and Gabaix and
Landier (2007), the board of directors has the function of monitoring and advising
to a¤ect the earning of rm assuming that the impact of a CEOs quality increases
with the size of the rm under his control. I also consider two possible relationships
between the CEO quality and the board quality, complement and substitute, in the
rm. This model shows that the big rms make board positions more attractive
compared to outside options. Second, when the marginal contribution of the CEOs
talent to the performance (the source of reputation value enjoyed by the board
member) is large enough, the talented CEO can be matched with the high qualied
outside directors. It follows that the board quality increases. Additionally, the
model can explain the observed fact that the quality of directors on the same boards
is dispersed. The estimations suggest that the talented ongoing CEOs and retired
CEOs go to the rms which have the high market capitalization values and the
large amount of sales to work as outside directors. The evidence for the e¤ect of
the incumbent CEOs talent is mixed. I also nd that the rms which have a large
amount of sales pay more to outside directors. The compensation for directors,
however, does not a¤ect the quality of boards.
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1 Introduction
Many researches have explored the characteristic of board and reached the consensus that
e¢ cient board should be composed of a majority of outside director. Colley and Stettinius
(2003) argue that one of the good attributes of board of director is to have no more than
two insiders directors on board. The reason is that board satisfying this criterion can be
considered more independent. Since many people believe that outside directors would
be more likely to represent the shareholders preference due to relative independence,
this view is widely accepted. It naturally follows that economic literatures analyze the
optimal board independence. Boards have two major functions: monitoring and advising
on management. We can predict that these two functions are key determinants of board
structures. Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Raheja (2005) provide theoretical background
for the structure of board. They argue that the board structure optimally respond to the
benet and cost of monitoring and advising. Lehn, Patro and Zhao (2004) and Linck,
Netter and Yang (2006a) empirically support this argument.
There exists another important aspect of board, the quality of board. Fama (1980)
argues that managers of high-performing rms are more likely to become outside directors
of rms because the market values directors according to their e¢ cacy as managers. The
market thinks that they have the expertness to guide and monitor managerial behavior.
Many research also conclude that rms prefer high qualied directors. (See Fama and
Jensen (1983), Gilson (1990), Kaplan and Reishus (1990), Li (1997), Ferris, Jagannathan
and Pritchard (2003) and Keys and Li (2004)). A little light, however, has been shed on
the determination of the boards quality.
Gabaix and Landier (2007) propose a simple competitive assignment model in the
CEO market to explain the CEO compensation. They assume that CEOs have hetero-
geneous talent level and are assigned to rms competitively. Also, the managerial impact
of a CEOs talent increase with the value of the rm under his control and CEOs earn
the value of their marginal product. Under these assumptions, they suggest that the best
CEO goes to the largest rms and the CEOs pay increases in the size of rm and the
size of average rm in the economy. Their empirical nding supports these predictions.
The most important determinant of the CEO compensation is the size of rms. Gar-
icano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) propose a model to explain the organization of work
in a knowledge economy. They show a positive sorting in a sense that highly qualied
managers are matched with the higher ability subordinates. The main driving force is
that the managers can share their ability with the workers under their control. In line
with these notions, I ask where the talented candidates go to work as outside directors
and whether the good CEOs are matched with the good board members or not.
This paper develops a simple matching model in the director market with outside
options to explain the board quality. The quality of outside directors on boards has
a direct (advising) and an indirect (monitoring) mechanism to a¤ect the earning of
rms assuming that the impact of CEOs quality increase in the value/size of rms
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under his control1 in this model. First, an outside director contributes to the earning of
rms directly by advising on the management. In this aspect, I consider two possible
relationships between the CEO quality and the board quality, complement and substitute,
in the organization of rm. They can interact each other positively, but it could be the
case that the CEO can dominate the decision making or the decision of the CEO can be
overriden by the board, too. Second, a highly qualied director increases the probability
of nding the true quality of incumbent CEO. On the demand side, the rm would like
to ll a vacancy with a candidate satisfying the minimum quality level. The minimum
quality level is analyzed based on Pissarides (2000). He provides the excellent work
for searching and matching in the labor market to incorporate the market condition
(matching function). On the supply side, a potential candidate for outside directors
compares the money value (board compensation) plus reputation value (depending on
the performance of rm) generated by the directorship to the outside option value. If
the outside option is so good for the highly qualied candidates, they would not contact
the rm which creates a vacancy for the outside director. Henceforth, the quality of
boards is determined by random matching between the minimum quality level required
by rm and the cuto¤ (maximum) quality level of the potential candidates who are likely
to contact.
This model shows that the size of rms would a¤ect the board quality in the following
manner. The larger size makes the earning of rms more sensitive to the board quality,
so that the larger sized rms pay more to outside directors. Also, the big rms give more
reputation values (generated by the performance of the rm) to board members. Conclus-
ively, the large size makes board positions more attractive to the talented candidates for
outside directors. Additionally, only when the marginal contribution of the CEOs talent
to the performance of rm is large enough, the more talented CEO can induce the high
qualied candidates. Suppose that there is "complementarity" between the quality of
CEO and board of directors. When the expected talent of the incumbent CEO rises, the
monitoring role becomes less important, but the advising role becomes more important.
Thus, when the gain of advising is large enough, the board compensation increases in
the expected talent of the incumbent CEO. Even if the board compensation decreases in
the expected talent of the incumbent CEO, the large reputational gain generated by the
increase in the expected talent of the incumbent CEO can make the board position more
attractive. In the "substitute" case, the board compensation decreases in the expected
talent of the incumbent CEO becasue the good CEO can dominate the decision-making
or the decision of the CEO can be overridden by the board. So, only when the marginal
contribution of the CEOs talent to the reputation value enjoyed by outside directors
is large enough, the more talented CEO can be matched with the good board member.
1We can interpret this assumption in the following manners: (1) The real power comes from the
amount of resource which the CEO can allocate. (2) The "Size-Skill Complementarity" exists in the
hierarchies of rm. Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) suggest that the ability of managers could be
amplied by the amount of controllable resource in the hierarchies of rm because talented employees can
share their ability (or knowledge) with the team under their control. In what follows, the more talented
employees hold higher positions in the equilibrium.
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Finally, the model suggests the possibility that the talented candidates (good rms) are
sometimes matched to the bad (of course, not too bad) rms (candidates) and the quality
of directors on the same boards is dispersed.
The empirical evidence supports the prediction of size e¤ect. The estimations show
that the talented ongoing CEOs and retired CEOs go to the rms which have the high
market capitalization values and the large amount of sales. The evidence for the e¤ect of
incumbent CEOs talent is mixed. I also nd that the rms which have a large amount
of sales pay more to outside directors. Additionally, the statistics shows the dispersion
of directorsquality on the same boards.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I provide a brief review
of the related literature. In section 3, I develop a model and provides the empirical
predictions. The Section 4 describes the data set and the empirical results. I summarize
concluding remarks in Section 5.
2 Related literature
This paper is mainly related with a eld which studies the quality of boards. They focus
on the relationship between the quality of potential candidates for outside directors and
the probability of serving as outside directors on boards.
2.1 The quality of boards
Fama (1980) argues that managers of high-performing rms are more likely to become
outside directors of rms because the market prices directors according to their e¢ cacy as
managers. The market thinks that they have attributes necessary to guide and monitor
managerial behavior. Kaplan and Reishus (1990) nd that the probability of a CEO
taking on an outside direct orship is positively related to their rms performance. Li
(1997) provides evidences that the labor market for directors is well functioning and
the market prices directors based on their performance as directors. Brickley, Linck
and Coles (1999) analyze directorships held by 277 CEOs who retired during 1989-1993
after they retired and show that accounting performance (ROA and industry adjusted
ROA) of CEO during the nal 4 years in o¢ ce has an economically signicant e¤ect on
the number of outside board seats they serve after retirement, but market performance
does not explain it.Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard (2003) nd that the performance
of rm which he has served as a director has a positive e¤ect on the number of other
appointments (other rmsoutside directorships) held by him, which is consistent with
Fama and Jensen (1983). Keys and Li (2004) nd that professional director are three
times more likely to receive additional directorships following a successful tender o¤er
for a rm on which they served as board members. Lee (2007c) analyzes directorships
held by 250 CEOs who retired during 1998-2002 in the two years after retirement and
nds counter-evidences that pre-retirement accounting performances do not have any
explaning power for the number of outside directorships held by CEOs 2 years after
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retirement and the rm size in which CEO worked before retirement is directly related
to the number of outside directorship.
Overally, many researches about corporate governance focus on the relationship
between quality of candidate for outside directors and probability of serving as directors
and conclude that the number of directorship a candidate serves increases in his quality
level. A little light, however, has been shed on the determination of the quality of boards.
The goal of this paper is to explain the board quality using the matching framework.
3 Model
3.1 Model: Searching and Matching
I construct a searching and matching model in which both potential candidates for outside
directorships and rms live forever and are risk neutral. The basic framework stems from
Pissarides (2000). There are potential candidates for outside directorships and rms
which are normalized to 1. Every potential candidate i with heterogenous quality, qinew;
has an outside option,2 so that their choice is whether to serve as an outside director or
enjoy an outside option. The choice of the rm is to decide whether to ll a vacancy for
an one outside director on boards or not. Neither quiting nor ring are allowed. The
quality, qinew; is 2 [0, 1]:
The vacancies and potential candidates who would be likely to contact (a subgroup of
potential candidates) are assumed to meet each other randomly in the director market.
When a vacancy is created, the rm j determines the minimum required quality level
and post it. Then, the rm j directs its search e¤ort toward the potential candidates
who satisfy this level. Also, the potential candidates who can enjoy the higher value to
work as the outside director in the rm j than the outside option value would be likely to
contact the rm j. The rm j meets potential candidates who would be likely to contact
(the candidates below the cuto¤ level quality) at the rate #j :3 I will explore below the
nature of steady-state equilibrium and focus on the quality level of outside directors on
boards. Hereafter, I omit the subscript i and j:
3.2 The value function
Firstly, I consider the supply side to develop the value function of a potential candidate
for outside directors. I begin with the value of an outside directorship for a potential
candidate with quality, qnew; in the rm requiring minimum quality level, qminnew: Neither
2This assumption captures the following facts. Many CEOs have several job position opportunities
after retirement except outside directorship (community board, goverment organization, o¢ cer in private
rms, consultant and so on). Ongoing CEOs also have many similar options.
3 In the classical random searching model, the contacting (meeting) function is given by
m(u; v) = m(
v
u
)u = m()u;  =
v
u
where u is the unemployment rate and v is the measure of vacancies. Under the assumptions that all
workers are the same and all rms are same, vacancies meet unemployed workers at the rate m()

:
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quiting nor ring are allowed.
Vc(qnew) = WBOARD| {z }
the money value
+ E[(qnew)]| {z }
the reputation value
+
1
1 + 
Vc(qnew); qnew  qminnew (1)
The value for a potential candidate of quality, qnew; who serve as an outside director in
the rm requiring minimum quality level, qminnew, denoted by Vc(qnew) equals the sum of
the return, wage (WBOARD) and the reputation value generated by outside directorship4
plus 11+Vc(qnew). The reputation value is dened by E[(qnew)] from the expected
performance (prot) of rms, E[(qnew)] where  is the sensitivity parameter5: The
outside director produces a performance, which requires only one factor, quality denoted
by qnew and he contributes to the performance of rm by monitoring and advising on
management. V oc represent the outside option value.  represent the discount rate. We
can rewrite above equation by
Vc(qnew) =
w + E[(qnew)]

(2)
The outside option value is dened by
V oc (qnew) = qnew +  +
1
1 + 
V oc (qnew) (3)
The value for a potential candidate of quality, qnew; who enjoys an outside option is
denoted by V oc (qnew) equals the return of an outside option plus
1
1+V
o
c (qnew): The return
of an outside option is assumed to have a fuctional form denoted by
qnew + ;  > 0
where  is the sensitivity parameter and  is the xed return from an outside option.
This implies the return of outside option increase in the talent of candidates. We can
rewrite equation (3) by
V oc (qnew) =
qnew + 

(4)
Secondly, I consider the vacancy for an outside director. Each rm faces decision
whether to ll a vacancy for an one outside director on boards or not. n is the total size of
outside board member when a rm does not have any vacancy. The new outside director
produces a performance, which requires only one factor, quality denoted by qnew and he
contributes to the performance of rm by monitoring and advising on management. The
value of the rm of lling a vacancy with a new outside director who has the quality
4Hambrick and Johnson (2000) said "The majority of outside directors are fully motivated to act
conscientiously and vigorously by forces other than a nancial stake in the rm: their sense of profes-
sionalism, concern for their reputations and stature, and the threat of lawsuit." (Colley and Stettinius
(2003), page 61).
5The performance of rms actually depends on the average quality level of outside directors on boards
when the new director enters into baords. For the sake of exposition, I express the value function in
terms of qnew: I will go in details later.
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level, qnew with quality requirement, qminnew; is given by
V newf (qnew) = E[(qnew)] +
1
1 + 
Vf (qnew); qnew  qminnew
The return of lling a vacancy is the expected performance of rms with the new director.
Then, we can redene V newf by
V newf (qnew) =
(1 + )E[(qnew)]

; qnew  qminnew (5)
The value of not lling a vacancy is given by
V sf (qs) = E[(qs)] +
1
1 + 

#V newf (qnew) + (1  #)V sf (qs)
	
(6)
where #6 denotes the arrival rate of potential candidates who try to nd an outside
director position satisfying the minimum quality level required by rm. qs represents
the average quality level of boards when the rm does not ll a vacancy. Rearranging
equation (6), we can get
V sf (qs) =
(1 + )E[(qs)] + #V
new
f (qnew)
 + #
3.3 The performance of rms
Here, I will derive the expected performance of rm. Based on Weisbach and Hermalin
(1998), Holmstrom (1999) and Hermalin (2005) I set up the timing for the following. At
the rst stage, a rm and a potential candidate for outside directors only have the prior
distribution of the quality of the incumbent CEO, q7; has mean  > 0: In the second
stage, the rm and outside board members would be likely to nd the ture quality of
the CEO, q with the probability which is equal to the average board quality, qn(or qs):
Otherwise, the rm and outside board members learn nothing: If the rm chooses a new
outside director with quality level, qnew; then the rm can nd the true quality with
probability
qn =
(n  1)qs + qnew
n
; (7)
but the rm learn nothing about the incumbent CEO with probability 1   qn: Finally,
the rm decides whether to re the CEO or not based on the true quality qu or the prior
expectation for the quality of the CEO and then the performance of the rm is realized.
This three-stage process is iterated at each period because the quality of CEO is specic
to the project implemented at each period and both the rm and outside board members
are uncertain about it. Since I focus on the steady-state path there is no dynamic change
in the parameters. The quality of potentially replaced CEO is randomly distributed with
6Note that # is endogenously determined. I will discuss about this later on.
7This assumption implies that it is uncertain that the CEOs (general) skill would be well matched
with the rm-specic project and environment.
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mean 0 < :8
As I assumed before, both the rm and outside board members know that the CEOs
ability is drawn from a distribution with mean  at the rst stage; which is the prior
expectation of the CEOs quality. If the rm and outside board members nd the true
quality for the quality of incumbent CEO with probability qn(or qs), the incumbent CEO
is red if
q < 0
It is clear that when the rm nds nothing, the incumbent CEO is retained.
3.3.1 CEO quality and Board quality
Case 1: Complement Now, I will derive the expected performance of rm which
depends on the quality of CEO and outside directors. I assume the symmetric com-
plementarities (Becker (1981) and Becker (1993)) between the CEO quality and board
quality. Based on Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) and Gabaix and Landier (2007), the
expected performance (prot) of rm when a vacancy is lled by a new outside director
is given by
E[(qk; qn)] = S


E[qk]  qn

| {z }
revenue
 WCEO   nWBOARD| {z }
cos t
; k = u or r (8)
where S denotes the value/size of the rms9, 0 <  < 1. Similarly, the expected per-
formance of rm when a vacancy is not lled
E[(qk; qs)] = S


E[qk]  qs

 WCEO   (n  1)Wboard; k = u or r
I assume that the expected performance of rm ; E[(qk; qn)]; mainly depends on the
quality of a current CEO in rm; qu; or the quality of a replaced CEO in rm; qr = 0;
multiplied by the advising role of outside directors on boards. The expected performance
of a rm when a vacancy is lled by a new outside director is dened by
E[(qk; qn)] = S


E[qk]  qn

 WCEO   nWboard
= qn  S  F (qu)  qu  qn + (1  qn)  S    qn
 WCEO   nWboard
where the second line on the right-hand side represents the expected revenue of the rm
when the rms nd the true quality and the third line represent the expected revenue
8This assumption guarantees that a incumbent CEO will not be red when the rm does not get any
information.
9This set-up reects the "Size-Skill Complementarity". See Gabaix and Landier (2007) for more
details.
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when the rms nd nothing: qn is the average quality of outside directors on boards.
F (qu) is the retaining probability of the incumbent CEO. We can easily nd E[(qk; qs)]
by similar method. Finally, we can get E[(qk; qi)] by 10
E[(qk; qi)] = 
qi
2 + Sqi  WCEO   n(or n  1)WBOARD; i = n or s (9)
where

(; S) = S [F (qu)qu   ] < 0
Here, I assume that qu < F (qu) : Otherwise, there is no ring because the ture quality
of the incumbent CEO is always greater than the prior expectation of the potentially
replaced CEO.
Case 2: Substitute Let me suppose that CEO quality and Board quality are
substitutes11. By adopting the production function originally introduced by Sah and
Stiglitz (1986), the expected performance of rm; E[(qk; qn)]; is given by
E[(qkc ; qi)] = qi  F (qu)  S [a  (qumax   qu)(1  qi)]
+(1  qi)  S [c  (umax   u)(1  qi)]
 WCEO   n(or n  1)WBOARD; i = n or s (10)
where a and c are given constant. qumax and umax represent the maximum value of the true
quality of the incumbent CEO and the maximum of the mean of the prior expectation
for the incumbent CEOs talent, respectively.
3.3.2 The implications for the board compensations
Case 1: Complement The compensation to each board member is assumed to
be equal to the marginal productivity of the average board quality by
WBOARD =
2
(; S)qi + S

n (or n  1) ; (11)
The marginal productivity of the board quality by the monitoring is expressed by 
(; S)qi,
which represents the expected gain from the perfect information for the incumbent CEO
minus the expected gain from the prior information. The marginal productivity by the
advising is given by

(; S)qi + S
 > 0
10You can nd the similar setting in Hermalin (2005).
11Eric Rasmusen points out that CEO quality and board quality can be substitutes in a sense that
the good CEO can dominate the decision-making or the decision of CEO can be overriden by the good
board.
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Proposition 1 (1) The compensation for directors increases in the value/size of rms.
(2) The compensation for directors increases in the prior expectaion for the quality of
incumbent CEOs if the average board quality is less than 1/2.
Proof. See in Appendix
It is straightforward that the high value/size of rm makes the role of monitoirng and
advising on boards more valuable. The increase in the prior expectation for the incum-
bent CEO talent ()makes the quality of board less important in terms of the monitoring.
Simply, we can interpret the marginal productivity of monitoring as the expected rev-
enue (gain) from nding the true quality minus the expected revenue (gain) from nding
nothing. From the view point of the monitoring, the increase in the expected talent of
the incumbent CEO makes the board less important, but the marginal productivity of
advising goes up when the expected talent of the incumbent CEO increases. Here, the
point is that the increase in the marginal productivity of advising diminishes when the
board quality rises. Conclusively, the marginal productivity of board quality increases
when the average board quality is less than 1/2.
Case 2: Substitute In this case, the compensation to each board member is given
by
WBOARD =
S (F (qu)  [a  (qumax   qu)(1  qi)]  [c  (umax   u)(1  qi)])
n (or n  1)
+
SqiF (q
u)(qumax   qu) + S(1  qi)(umax   u)
n (or n  1) (12)
Proposition 2 (1) The compensation for directors increases in the value/size of rms.
(2) The compensation for directors decreases in the prior expectaion for the quality of
incumbent CEOs.
Proof. Omitted
It is also straightforward that the high value/size of rm makes the role of monitoirng
and advising on boards more valuable. Be careful that the advising role becomes less
important when the prior expectation for the CEO quality rises. Since we assume that
the good CEO can dominate the decision making or the CEOs decision can be overridden
by the board, the highly talented CEO can make the board less important even in terms
of advising.
3.3.3 The implications for the CEO compensations
Case 1: Complement Here, we can have two di¤erent implications for the e¤ect
of board quality on the incumbent CEOs compensations. The above executive compens-
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ations (WCEO) is composed of two parts, given by
WCEO =W
u
CEO +W
r
CEO
W uCEO is the compensation level of the incumbent CEO
12, and W rCEO denotes the wage
level of the potentially replace CEO. Here, I only focus on the wage level of the incumbent
CEO. Suppose that given the board quality, the wage of the incumbent CEO (W uCEO) is
equal to the expected marginal productivity of the incumbent CEOs quality when he is
not red, denoted by
W uCEO =  Sqi2 + Sqi (13)
Then, the good quality boards pay more to the incumbent CEO if the average board
quality is higher than 1/2. It implies that when the e¤ect of the advsing is high enough,
the marginal productivity of the incumbent CEO increases with respect to the board
quality.
Case 2: Substitute From the equation (10), (W uCEO) is given by
W uCEO = (1  qi)2  S (14)
Then, the good quality boards pay less to the incumbent CEO. First of all, when the
board quality increases, the probability of the incumbent CEOs ring increases. Second,
the good board makes the CEO less valuable because the good board can dominate the
decision.
In a totally di¤erent angle, we can predict that the high quality boards make the rms
pay more to incumbent CEOs based on Hermalin (2005)13. He assumes that a CEO will
accept the wage level, W uCEO ; if his expected utility is greater than some reservation
utility, U: He also assumes that if a CEO will not be red, he enjoys some additional
benets, b. Then, he accepts W uCEO only if
W uCEO + b fqiF (qu) + (1  qi)g  U
Under the assumptions that the above constraint is binding, the CEO compensation is
given by
W uCEO = U   b fqiF (qu) + (1  qi)g
Then, @W
u
CEO
@qi
> 0; which implies that the CEO compensations increase in the board
quality.
12 I assume that WuCEO is given to the incumbent CEO before nding a good information or bad
information.
13See Hermalin (2005), page 2369.
11
3.4 The cuto¤ quality of searching
Now, I will derive the endogenous cuto¤ quality level of searching an outside director
position, denoted by qcutnew: To that purpose, I solve the following equation which charac-
terizes the cuto¤ level
B(qcutnew) =WBOARD + E[(q
k
c ; q
cut
new)] = q
cut
new +  = C(q
cut
new); (15)
@B(qcutnew)
@qcutnew
> 0;
@C(qcutnew)
@qcutnew
> 0
For the simplicity, I supress the cost part of E[(qkc ; q
cut
new)] in the equation (9)
14 and
assume that  = 1. The left side represents the benet of outside directorship and the
right side of the cost of outside directorship. The cuto¤ level is determined to equate
above equation.
Proposition 3 Under some restrictions for the parameters, there exist a unique cuto¤
quality level which guarantees that the potential candidates with qnew  qcutnew are likely to
contact. Then, (1) the cuto¤ quality level increases in the value/size of the rms in the
both "complement" and "substitute" case. (2) The cuto¤ quality level increases in the
prior expectation for the quality of incumbent CEOs if the average board quality is less
than (n 2)+
p
n2+4
2n in the "complement" case and less than
n 2
n in the "substitute" case.
Proof. See in Appendix.
The driving force behind the increase in the cuto¤ quality level is straightforward.
As shown above, the potential candidates maximize the money value plus the reputation
value generated by outside directors, given by
WBOARD| {z }
the money value
+ E[(qkc ; q
cut
new)]| {z }
the reputation value
= 2
(; S)qi + S
+ 
 

qi
2 + Sqi

The marginal productivity of average board quality, increases in the value of rms (S).
The logic behind this is for the following. Gabaix and Landier (2007) assume that the
managerial impact of CEO increases when the resource under his control increases. In
line with this notion, the e¤ect of the board becomes large in the large rm due to the
increase in the impact of monitoring and advising. Henceforth, both the money value
and the reputation value increases, which makes the board position more attractive.
The increase in the prior expectation for the quality of incumbent CEOs makes board
positions more valueable. Intuitively, when the expected talent of the incumbent CEO is
good, the monitoring becomes less useless. However, the impact of the advising becomes
more important due to the complementarity between the quality of the CEO and board of
directors. If the board quality is low enough, the increased gain in the advising outweighs
the increased loss in the monitoring.
14Whether supressing the cost part or not does not a¤ect the prediction of this model.
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3.5 The minimum quality level
The minimum quality level for a new outside director required by the rm is endogenously
determined to equate the following equation15.
C(qminnew) : E[(q
k
c ; q
min
new)] = 
8<:(1 + )
n
E[(qkc ; qs)] + #

E[(qkc ;q
min
new)]

o
 + #
9=; : B(qminnew)
(16)
I also suppress the cost part of E[(qkc ; q
min
new)] in the equation (9): The left side repres-
ents the cost of one more searching and the right side denotes the benet of one more
searching. I focus on the case that there exist a unique and interior cuto¤ quality level
which guarantees that the potential candidates with qnew  qcutnew are likely to contact.
Now, I will dene the functional form of the arrival rate. For the simplicity, suppose
that each candidate in qminnew  qnew  qcutnew might be equally or unequally acceptable to
a subset of rms which create a vacancy. Then, the arrival rate of a potential candidate
i with quality, qinew in q
min
new  qnew  qcutnew to rm j denoted by #j;i can be assumed to
be given by
#j;i(q
i
new) =  ih(q
i
new)
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where  i captures the property that each candidate in q
min
new  qnew  qcutnew might be
equally or unequally acceptable to a subset of rms which create a vacancy17. h(qinew)
represents the density of potential candidates with quality, qinew: Then the aggreate
arrival rate which satises qminnew  qnew  qcutnew is given by
#j =
Z qcutnew
qminnew
 ih(q
i
new)dq
i
new;
@#j
@qcutnew
> 0;
@#j
@qminnew
< 0 (17)
Plugging equation (17) into (16) we can get
E[(qkc ; q
min
new)]
= 
8<:(1 + )
h
E[(qkc ; qs)] +
R qcutnew
qminnew
 ih(q
i
new)dq
i
new

E[(qkc ;q
min
new)]

i
 +
R qcutnew
qminnew
 ih(q
i
new)dq
i
new
9=; (18)
Proposition 4 Under the some restrictions for parameters; there exist a unique quality
level which guarantees that the rm would like to ll a vacancy with a potential candidate
satisfying qminnew  qnew. Also, (1) the minimum quality level increases in the value/size of
15See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), page 88.
16We can think that the arrival rate has a simple functional form of  u
v
( is constant), where u is the
unemployed rate and v is the measure of vacancy.  (qinew) can be interpreted as
1
v
:
17 If each candidate in qminnew  qnew  qcutnew is unequally acceptable to a subset of rms which create a
vacancy  i is the function of q
i
new: For instance, if highly qualied candidates are acceptable to a large
subset of rms which create a vacancy,  i is decreasing in q
i
new: If each candidate in q
min
new  qnew  qcutnew
is equally acceptable to a subset of rms which create a vacancy  i can be assumed to be invariant across
qinew:
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rms, S. (2) The minimum quality level increases in the prior expectation for the incum-
bent CEOs, ; if the average board quality is less than (n 2)+
p
n2+4
2n in the "complement"
case and less than n 2n in the "substitute" case.
Proof. See in Appendix
When the value/size of rms increases, both the cost and benet of one more search-
ing rise. However, the increase in the benet outweighs the increase in the cost of benet.
Conclusively, the minimum quality level increases in the size/value of rms. More con-
cretely, the cuto¤ quality level increases in the value/size of rms and this causes the
minimum quality level to increase. When the cuto¤ level rises, the aggregate arrival rate
#j increase, which implies that the rms are more likely to meet talented candidates in
the future. Henceforth the rms can set up the high minimum quality level. This logic
also could be applied to the increase in the prior expectation for the quality of incumbent
CEOs.
3.6 The steady-state equilibrium quality of boards
I will focus on the case that there exist a unique and interior cuto¤ quality level which
guarantees that the potential candidates with qnew  qcutnew would be likely to contact
the rm. The matching is randomly consummated between the potential candidate in
qminnew  qnew  qcutnew and the rm requiring qminnew because all matches satises the following
conditions:
Vc(qnew) + V
new
f (qnew) > V
o
c (qnew) + V
s
f (qnew); q
min
new  qnew  qcutnew
The equilibrium quality of a new director qnew is dened by
qnew =
 Z qcutnew
qminnew
i;j(q
i
new)q
i
newdq
i
new
!
where i;j(q
i
new) represents the de-genereated probability that a potential candidate i
with qinew in  = fqnew j qminnew  qnew  qcutnewg rstly meets the rm j. Clearly,R qcutnew
qminnew
i;j(q
i
new)dq
i
new = 1: Henceforth, the equilibrium quality of boards is given by
qn
  qcutnew(; S); qminnew(; S)
=
8<:(n  1)qs +
R qcutnew
qminnew
i;j(q
i
new)q
i
newdqnew

n
9=;
3.7 Comparative statics and empirical prediction
For the sake of exposition, I assume that the de-genereated probability that a potential
candidate i with qinew in  = fqnew j qminnew  qnew  qcutnewg rstly meets the rm j has
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the functional form of
i;j(q
i
new) =

1
qcutnew   qminnew

It implies that (1) the probability is invariant across the quality of directors in  =
fqnew j qminnew  qnew  qcutnewg; and (2) if the pool of potential candidates satisfying
qminnew  qnew  qcutnew increases, the probability that each potential candidate i with qinew
in qminnew  qnew  qcutnew rstly meets the rm j decreases, denoted by
@i;j
@qminnew
> 0;
@i;j
@qcutnew
< 0:
Then, the equilibrium quality of a new director qnew boils down to
qnew(; S) =

qcutnew(; S) + q
min
new(; S)
	
2
and the equilibrium quality of boards boils down to
qn
  qcutnew(; S); qminnew(; S)
=
(n  1)qs
n
+
1
n

qcutnew(; S) + q
min
new(; S)
2

Proposition 5 (1) The equilibrium quality of a new director qnew would increase in the
value/size of rm, S (2) The equilibrium quality of a new director qnew would increase
in the prior expectation for the incumbent CEOs, if the average board quality is less than
(n 2)+pn2+4
2n in the "complement" case and less than
n 2
n in the "substitute" case.
Proof. See in Appendix
We already discussed the driving force behind the increase in the cuto¤ quality level
and minimum quality level. The equilibrium quality of a new director qnew, is determined
by the random matching between qminnew and q
cut
new; so it is clear that the increase in the
value of rms and the prior expectation for the talent of incumbent CEOs make the
boards highly qualied.
4 Data and empirical result
4.1 Proxy for quality of boards
The Board members are usually composed of rms executives (CEO, CFO etc.,), other
rmsCEOs, executives, retired CEOs, lawyers, professors and so on. In this paper, I
focus on the quality of outside directors, specially ongoing CEOs and retired CEOs from
other rms. When we proxy the quality of retired CEOs and current CEOs, there are
two possible candidates.
The rst one is the total compensations paid to them when they worked/are working
as CEOs. Gabaix and Landier (2007) develop the model which shows that the best CEO
goes to the largest rm in a competitive assignment market and the larger rms pay
more to CEOs. Their empirical nding supports this argument. In this sense, the total
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compensation level paid to them when they worked/are working as CEOs could reect
thier quality18. Secondly, the rm size at which they worked before retirements/are
working is a good proxy for the quality. Gabaix and Landier (2007) empirically show
that the rm size is the most important observable determinant of CEO compensations.
Lee (2007c) analyzes directorships held by 250 CEOs who retired during 1998-2002 in
the two years after retirement. He nds that the rm size (total assets) in which CEO
worked before retirement is directly related to the number of outside directorships19.
The rms prefer retired CEOs from large rms as outside board members. In this sense,
we can use the rm size at which retired CEOs worked as a proxy for the quality20.
4.2 Overall quality of boards: sample selection
I select 266 rms among Fortune 500 U.S rms in 2005 year and collect board proles
of those rms in 2005 year. I collect board informations from the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) lings to search each rms proxy statement (ling form:
DEF 14A)21. I, rst, classify board members into insiders and outsiders. I adopt the
following classication method22.
Inside director = current employee + former employee
Outside director = All other directors
The outside directors are mainly composed of other rmsongoing CEO, retired CEO,
executives, lawyer and professors. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for our sample.
Table 1
Almost half of the outside directors on boards is ongoing CEOs in other rms plus retired
CEOs from other company. The boards tend to contain more retired CEOs (2.5) than
18 In a slightly di¤erent angle, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) show that the equilibrium wage is
increasing and convex in the ability of agents in the hierarchies of rms because the top managers share
their ability with a team under their control. The rms pay top managers more than proportional to
their talent. So, the log value of the wage could be the better proxy for the quality of ongoing/retired
CEOs.
19Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) also show that the rm size in which CEOs worked before retirement
well explains the number of outside directorship held by CEOs 2 years after retirement.
20Additionally, the accounting performance is the possible candidate. Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999)
analyze directorships held by 277 CEOs who retired during 1989-1993 after they retired and show that
the accounting performance (ROA and industry adjusted ROA) of CEOs during the nal 4 years in o¢ ce
has an economically signicant e¤ect on the number of outside board seats they hold after retirement.
The nal one is the change in the market capitalization of rms they worked/are working as CEOs. The
stock return during tenure is the another possibilty, but Eric Rasmusen provides the helpful comments
about this. He said " The stock return of the old company is not good enough. If a CEO is predicted
when he begins his job to be good, then his company should just have a normal market return, not
above-market. An above-market return only indicates he is doing better than expected."
21The Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) provides board and committee information.
We, however, need more detailed information for board members, so I handy-collect proles from SEC
lings.
22This classication is used in Linck, Netter and Yang (2006a). Lehn, Patro and Zhao (2004) classify
directors into three categories: (1) inside directors, (2) outside directors, and (3) gray directors
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ongoing CEOs (1.99).
I use the CEO compensations/size of rm (market capitalization value23) as the
proxy for the quality of boards in this paper. I nd the executive compensation data
for 487 ongoing/retired CEOs and the rm size (market capitalization value) of 659
ongoing/retired CEOs on boards. In case of ongoing CEOs, I use the compensation
values/market capitalizations in 2004. For retired CEOs, I use the compensation val-
ues/market capitalizations one year before retirements and convert all values into 2004
year values, using the median growth rate of CEO compensations. For instance, if A
directors retired in 2002, his quality is
The quality of A director
= (The compensation as the CEO in 2001)
(1+The median growth rate of CEO compensations between 2001 to 2004)
The median growth rate of executive compensations and market capitalizations are re-
ported in Table 2.
Table 2
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the quality of boards. Here, the proxies for
the quality of boards is the averaged CEO compensation levels as CEOs (See Table 3-A).
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test shows that the quality of boards only averaged over retired
CEOs on boards is signicantly higher than the quality of boards averaged over ongoing
CEOs on boards. Table 3-B also supports this nding. The mean quality of retired
CEOs who work as outside directors in 2005 is signicantly higher than the mean quality
of ongoing CEOs on boards. The fth and last column of Table 3-A provide evidence
that the quality of directors on the same board is dispersed. For instance, the mean level
of the ranking di¤erence between the highest talented director and the lowest one on the
same board is 226.88.
Table 3
4.3 Overall quality of boards: empirical result
Based on Proposition 5, the specication is given by
qi
 = G(Si; ui; ) + 
where qi is the average board quality of rm i, Si is the value/size of rm i and ui is
the prior expectation for quality of the incumbent CEO in the rm i. The proxy for the
value/size of rm is (1) the market capitalization, (2) the amount of sales, and (3) the
23Following Gabaix and Landier (2007), the market capitalization value is dened as the sum of market
value of equity and book value of debt.
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total assets. The proxy for the prior expectation for quality of the incumbent CEO is
the wage paid to the incumbent CEO.
Table 4 shows the main outcome. The dependent variable in Table 4 is the quality
of other rmsongoing CEOs and retired CEOs as outside directors on boards which is
proxied by the natural log value of the averaged compensations as CEO. The independent
variables are the characteristics of rms which ongoing CEOs and retired CEOs work as
board members. Overally, the talented candidates work (as outside directors) at rms
which have a large amount of sales.24 In the Table 5, I iterate the same regression with the
di¤erent proxy for the quality, the market capitalization. The outcome is qualitatively
similar as the outcome of Table 4.
Table 5
4.4 Quality of new board members: sample selection
The drawback of previous approach is that I do not take into account the joining year
of each outside director on boards. For instance, A director joins on boards in 2005, B
director in 2003, and C director in 2001. To x this problem, I construct another data
set. I download the 2001-2005 board proles of U.S rms which have total asset values
greater than $1,000 million in 2004 from The Investor Responsibility Research Center
(IRRC) data base Then, I select ongoing CEOs who newly join the boards as outside
directors during 1995-2005.25
24 I also use the quantile regression to capture the di¤erent e¤ect of the explanatory variables across the
di¤erent quantile range of the board quality. The outcome is that (1) the sale is important, and (2) the
board compensation is positively signicant only in the lower-middle quantile range. The qth quantile
regression estimator
^
qminimizes
NX
i:yix0i
q j yi   x
0
i j +
NX
i:yix0i
(1  q) j yi   x
0
i j
See Cameron and Trivedi (2004) on page 87.
25 In the regressions, I only use the data for the newly joined directors during 200-2005 because of the
data availability.
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Figure 2: Time trend of the newly joined directorsquality
Table 6/Figure 2 show the time trend of directorsquality during 1995-2005. It shows
that the quality of newly joined directors had increased during 1995-2000, but it shows
the break in 2001. The quality had decreased during 2001-2005.
Table 6
4.5 Quality of new board member: empirical result
Similar as before, the specication is based on Proposition 5, given by
qnew;j = G(Si; ui; ) + 
where qnew;j is the quality of newly joined director j on board i; Si is the value/size of
rm i and  is the prior expectation for quality of the incumbent CEO of rm i.
Table 7 provides the outcome of the regression.26 The approach is the same as Table
4. In Table 7-A and 7-B, the dependent variable is the quality of the newly joined director
j on board i proxied by the compensation level as CEO and the market capitalization of
the CEOs original rm one year before joining the boards, respectively. Overally, the
coe¢ cients of the market capitalizations of rm i is positively signicant.
Table 7
We can interprete that the talented ongoing CEOs go to rms which have the big size
to work as outside directors on boards. However, the e¤ect of talented incumbent CEO
is ambiguous. In the OLS estimations, the coe¢ cient of the Ln(CEO compensation) is
positively signicant. However, there might be an endogeneity problem. From equation
(10) and (11), we can see that the board quality might a¤ect the CEO compensation.
26 I do not report the outcome of 2SLS and 2SLAD, but the outcome is qualitatively similar as the
outcome in Table 4-C and 4-D.
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To test this, I use 2SLS. Based on Core and Larcker (1999), I use the dummy variable
whether the CEO also takes the chariman position or not as the instrument for the
CEO compensaion. I also use the tenure as the CEO. The market capitalization is still
positively signicant, but the e¤ect of the incumbent CEOs talent disappears.
4.6 Quality vs Experience
Here, an issue could be raised. Simply, we can have two possible theories to explain the
emprical evidence: (1) Ongoing and former CEOs of big companies make better directors
for any company, and (2) Ongoing and former CEOs of big comanies make good directors
of big companies, but not small companies27. The argument of this paper is the rst one.
In the second theory, the matching is consummated between the ongoing (former) CEOs
of big company and the big company because the experience of big companiesongoing
(former) CEOs is more valued only in the big companiesboards, which implies that the
driving force behind the matching is not the quality, but the experience28. To test this,
I adopt the following strategy: I calculate the predicted board quality based on the rst
OLS estimation in Table 7-A. Then, I measure the error term by
Error = y   ypredicted
The high error term indicates the rms which have ongoing (former) CEOs of bigger
companies as outside directors than expected. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test shows that
the return on asset (ROA) of rms which are in the range of upper 75% error term
is signicantly higher than complements. The rms which perform well can get big
rmsongoing (former) CEOs, which provides evidence that the deriving force behind
the match in the directorship market is not the experience.
27Eric Rasmusen enlights me that we can have two di¤erent interpretations for the outcome of regres-
sions.
28Konstantin Tyurin provides fruitful comments about this. He comments that " To put it plainly,
your theory makes, among other things, a testable prediction about the relationship between quality of
the company board and the size of the company. So ultimately you are testing whether the size of the
company where a given former (or ongoing) executive is a currently a board member is positively related
to the average size of the companies where he served (is serving) as CEO in the past (now). This is
exactly the matching story youre trying to explore in your theoretical part. However, the matching may
have nothing (or little) to do with quality of CEOs, but rather be explained by the fact that experience
accumulated as a CEO in a jumbo company would be more valuable if the same person serves on board of
another jumbo company, and, conversely, experience accumulated as a CEO is a smaller-sized company
would be more valuable if the same individual serves on board of another smaller-sized company upon
retirement. Then you have changed the story that youre trying to test: its nothing to do with quality
but has a lot to do with nding a good match. To make an analogy with other markets (like marriage
market), its not the quality that is driving the outcome but rather the driving force is a good match.
In other words, smaller-size companiesCEOs and board members may not be inferior in quality, but
simply the experience accumulated in such smaller companies may be di¤erent from the experience in
supersize companies. Then, its not the quality that matters but the type of experience."
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4.7 The board quality and CEO compensations
Here, I explore the e¤ect of board quality on the CEO compensations. There is academic
discussion about the relationship between the corporate governance (or board structure)
and the CEO compensations. Core and Larcker (1999) suggest that the rms with weak
board sturctures pay more to CEOs. Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argue that the current
increase in the CEO compensations can be explained by the increase in managerial
entrenchment. Conversely, Hermalin (2005) suggests that the increase in CEO pay is
due to the tighter corporate governance. Gabaix and Landier (2007) provide evidence
that the rise in CEO pay is partly due to the weak corporate governance, but the e¤ect
is relatively small.
First, I run the regression of the CEO compensations on the size, performances,
and the board structures of rms. Based on the equations (13) and (14), the basic
specication is
ln(WCEO;i) = 1 ln(Si) + 2 ln(ui) + 3 ln(qi) + 
where WCEO;i denotes the CEO compensation of rm i, Si is the value/size of rm i, ui
is the prior expectation for the incumbent CEOs quality of rm i, and qi denotes the
average board quality of rms i:
Table 8
Table 8 provides OLS estimations to focus on the relationships between the CEO pay
and board quality. Previously, I measure the average board quality of approximately
200 U.S rms in 2005, which is proxied by the compensation levels. Here, I use it as
the explanatory variable. The dependent varible is the CEO compensations (TDC 1 on
Compustat data base) in 2005 and other explanatory variables are the 2004 year values
except the quality of boards, the tenure as a CEO, and other board structures. The
coe¢ cient on the quality of boards is positively signicant, which implies that the strong
boards pay more to CEOs.
There might be an endogeneity problem, again. The CEO compensation might have
an e¤ect on the board quality. To test this, I design the following simultanuous equations:
ln(WCEO;i;2005) = 1 ln(Xi;2004) + 2I2004 + 3 ln(Zi;2005) + 4q

i;2005 + 
qi;2005 = 1 ln(Xi;2004) + 2 ln(Yi;2004) + 2 ln(WCEO;i;2005) + "
where WCEO;i;2005 denotes the CEO compensation of rm i in 2005 and qi;2005 is the
board quality of rm i in 2005. Xi;2004 includes the market capitalization, total assets,
and total sales. I2004 is the ROA, market-to-book ratio, and the long-term debt divided
by the total assets. Zi;2005 is the tenure as a CEO, and other board structures. Yi;2004 is
the compensation for directors. The outcome of 2SLS is also reported in Table 8. The
instrument for the board quality is the board compensation, Yi;2004: It shows that the
board quality does not a¤ect the CEO compensation, but "Durbin-Wu-Hausman" test
shows that OLS estimator is not hurt by the endogeneity.
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4.8 The director compensations
Based on Proposition 1, I now regress the board compensations on the characterstics of
rms. In the "complement" case, the board compensations are given by
WBOARD =
2
(; S)qi + S

n (or n  1)
and in the "substitute" case, the board compensations are given by
WBOARD =
S (F (qu)  [a  (qumax   qu)(1  qi)]  [c  (umax   u)(1  qi)])
n (or n  1)
+
SqiF (q
u)(qumax   qu) + S(1  qi)(umax   u)
n (or n  1)
If follows that the basic empirical estimation is
ln(WBOARD;i) = 1 ln(Si) + 2 ln(i) + "
whereWBOARD;i represents the board compensation of rm i, Si is the value/size of rm
i and i is the prior expectation for the incumbent CEO in the rm i. I download the
board compensations data of U.S rms which have total asset values greater than $5,
000 million in 2005. The board compensations are the annual director fees in 2005 ($
thousand). All characteristics of rms are 2004 year values.
Table 9
Table 9 shows the descriptive statistics29 and the distribution of board compensations30.
Table 10
Table 10 provides OLS and quantile estimation results. Overall, the rms which have
a large amount of sales and which have the good CEO pay more to board members.
When the amount of sale increases by 1%, the board compensations increases by 0.66%.
However, the e¤ect of sale is diminishing.
29You can nd another statistics for the board compensation in Adams (2003) and Linck, Netter and
Yang (2006b).
30The median annual director fee per board meeting is 7.28 in $ thousand. I calculate the annual
director fee per board meeting by
Median annual director fee
Median number of board meeting
:
The median number of board meeting is based on Linck, Netter and Yang (2006b). For the comparison,
the median total cash compensation of CEO per day is 9.62 in $ thousand which is calculated by
The median total cash compensation of CEO
working day (  250)
22
5 Conclusion
I construct a searching and matching model to explain the quality of outside directors on
boards as an equilibrium phenomena. I assume that the quality of the CEO and board
member interact with the value/size of rms under their control. The model shows that
the main determinants of board quality are the value/size of rms and the expected talent
of the incumbent CEO. This model also explains two observed facts that the talented
candidates (good rms) are sometimes matched to the bad (of course, not too bad) rms
(candidates) and the quality of directors on the same boards is dispersed.
The empirical evidence supports the prediction of size e¤ect. The talented ongoing
CEOs and retired CEOs go to the rms which have the high market capitalization values
and the large amount of sales. However, the e¤ect of incumbent CEOs talent is ambigu-
ous. I also nd that the rms which have a large amount of sale pay more to outside
directors, but the board compensation is not related with the board quality.
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6 Appendix
Proof. of the proposition 1: Taking derivative the compensation of the board with
respect to the size of the rm, we can get
@WBOARD
@S
=
@ (2S [F (qu)qu   ] qi + S)
@S
=
@ (S (2 [F (qu)qu   ] qi + ))
@S
Since we assume that qi <
 
2(F (qu)qu ) ;
@WBOARD
@S > 0: When we take derivative the
compensation of the board with respect to the prior expectation of the incumbent CEO,
it is given by
@WBOARD
@
=
@ (2S [F (qu)qu   ] qi + S)
@
=
@ (S (2 [F (qu)qu   ] qi + ))
@
= S ( 2qi + 1)
Thus, if qi < 12 ;then the board compensation increases in the prior expectation of the
incumbent CEO.
Proof. of Proposition 3: Rewritting the benet and cost of the outside directorships
by
B(qcutnew) =WBOARD + E[(q
k
c ; q
cut
new)]
and
C(qcutnew) = q
cut
new + 
Since@B(q
cut
new)
@qcutnew
> 0; @
2B(qcutnew)
@qcutnew@q
cut
new
< 0; and @C(q
cut
new)
@qcutnew
> 0; there exist a unique cuto¤ quality
level which guarantees that the potential candidates with qnew  qcutnew are likely to
contact if CEOS

n (or n 1) >  and
2
(;S)+CEOS

n (or n 1) + (
 + CEOS
) <  + : Taking the
partial derivative of the benec and cost of the outside directorships with respect to the
size of the rm in the "complement case", we can get
@B(qcutnew)
@S
=
@WBOARD
@S
+

qi
2 + CEOS
qi
@S
and
@C(qcutnew)
@S
= 0
ReplacingWBOARD by the equations (7) or (10), it can be easily shown that
@B(qcutnew)
@S > 0,
26
which implies that @q
cut
new
@S > 0: Similarly, we can nd that
@qcutnew(;S)
@ > 0 if
qi <
(n  2) +pn2 + 4
2n
By similar method, it can be easily shown that @q
cut
new
@S > 0 and
@qcutnew(;S)
@ > 0 if
qi <
n  2
n
Proof. of Proposition 4: The left-hand side of the equation (16) is the cost of one
more searching. It can be easily shown that
@E[(qkc ; q
min
new)]
@qminnew
> 0
The right-hand side represents the benet of one more searching. For simplicity, let
#j(q
cut
new; q
min
new) =
R qcutnew
qminnew
 ih(q
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i
new:Taking the derivative with respect to q
min
new
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Rearranging above equation,
@B(qminnew)
@qminnew
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(1 + )
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It is straightforward that C(qs) < B(qs): So, if C(qcutnew)  B(qcutnew); there exist a unique
minimum quality level which guarantees that the rm would like to ll a vacancy with
a potential candidate satisfying qminnew  qnew  qcutnew. Next, we consider the e¤ect of the
rm value/size on the minimum quality level. Let me revist the equation (16). Taking
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At the minimum quality level, B(qminnew)  C(qminnew): Then,
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Rearranging above equation (and simplifying notations),
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Finally, we can get
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then dq
min
new
dS > 0: In this model, I assume that the above condition is satised. When
the value/size of rm increases, the increase in the benet outweighs the increase in the
cost of benet. Conclusively, the minimum quality level increases in the size/value of
rms. By similar method, we can conclude that the minimum quality level increases in
the prior expectation for the quality of incumbent CEOs in the "complement" case if
qi <
(n  2) +pn2 + 4
2n
and the minimum quality level increases in the prior expectation for the quality of in-
cumbent CEOs in the "substitute" case if
qi <
n  2
n
Proof. of Proposition 5: Since (1) @q
cut
new(;S)
@S > 0 and (2)
@qminnew(;S)
@S > 0; then
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Similarly, Since (1) @q
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qi <
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;
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n
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in the "substitute" case, then
@qnew(; S)
@
=
n
@qcutnew(;S)
@ +
@qminnew(;S)
@
o
2
> 0
Overally, the equalibrium quality of board member increases in the rm value and the
expectation for the talent of incumbent CEOs.
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Table 1 Sample distribution of board composition   
• I collect board profiles of 266 firms among Fortune 500 U.S firms in 2005 from the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings to search each firm’s proxy 
statement (filing form: DEF 14A) 
• Number of observation: 266 firms 
• All value is the average value 
• Total: Total number of directors on boards 
• Out: Total number of outside directors 
• Ongoing: the total number of other firm’s ongoing CEO on boards. These members 
are qualified as outside directors 
• Retired:  the total number of CEOs who retired from other firms on boards. These 
members are also classified as outside directors.  
• Ongoing plus Retired/Out(%) denotes the proportion of ongoing plus retired CEOs in 
the total number of outside directors on boards 
• % is the percentage on boards. 
• All values are mean value 
 
 
 
 Total Out % 
Ongoing 
plus 
Retired 
% Ongoing plus Retired/Out(%) Ongoing % Retired % 
Mean 11.23 9.53 84.59 4.45 39.72 46.86 1.98 17.82 2.46 21.75
           
Standard 
deviation 2.14 2.24 9 2.08 17.42 20.2 1.52 13.34 1.48 12.61
           
Min 7 4 44.44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
           
Max 20 17 100 11 88.89 100 10 71.43 8 72.73
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Table 2 The growth rate of CEO compensation, market capitalization, total assets, 
and sale 
• I download the CEO compensations/ other financial information of firms which have 
total assets greater than $ 5,000 million in 2005 from Compustat data base 
• All values are the median growth rate  
• The CEO compensation includes the following item: Salary, Bonus, Other Annual, 
Total Value of Restricted Stock Granted, Total Value of Stock Options Granted 
(using Black-Scholes), Long-Term Incentive Payouts, and All Other Total. 
• The market capitalization is the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt 
 
 
 
 
CEO 
compensation 
Market 
capitalization
Total 
assets Sales 
Return 
on 
assets 
Board 
compensation 
(Annual 
director fee) 
2003-
2004 0.15 0.11 0.08 0.1 0.079 0 
       
2002-
2004 0.17 0.29 0.2 0.19 0.123 0.16 
       
2001-
2004 0.11 0.29 0.29 0.18 0.186 0.3 
       
2000-
2004 0.26 0.37 0.43 0.23 -0.001 0.39 
       
1999-
2004 0.39 0.55 0.61 0.44 -0.001 0.47 
       
1998-
2004 0.7 0.65 0.87 0.57 -0.007 0.55 
       
1997-
2004 0.86 0.89 1.21 0.84 -0.05 0.67 
       
1996-
2004 1.3 1.54 1.59 1.51 -0.117 0.71 
       
1995-
2004 1.93 2.02 1.93 1.51 -0.16 0.79 
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Table 3-A Descriptive statistics for the average board quality 
• The average quality of boards of 266 firms among Fortune 500 U.S firms in 2005   
• All values are in $ thousand 
• Proxy for the average board quality:  the compensations as CEOs, averaged over 
the retired CEOs plus ongoing CEOs on the same board 
• For the ongoing CEOs: the compensation as CEOs in 2004 year 
• For the retired CEOs: the converted level of compensations as CEOs one year 
before retirement. If A director retired in 2002, his quality is measured by 
(compensation as CEO in 2001)*(1+the median growth rate of CEO 
compensation between 2001 and 2004) 
• The Wilcoxon rank-sum test shows that the mean of  “The quality of   boards: 
retired CEOs only” is significantly higher than the mean of “The quality of   
boards: ongoing CEOs only” at 1% level 
• The last column shows the ranking difference between the highest director and 
lowest director on the same board. I rank 487 ongoing CEOs and former CEOs 
by the compensation levels as CEOs. 
 
 
 
The quality 
of boards 
The quality of   
boards: 
ongoing CEOs 
only 
The quality of   
boards: retired 
CEOs only 
The maximum 
quality-the 
minimum quality 
on the same 
boards 
The lowest 
ranking-the 
highest 
ranking 
on the same 
boards 
Mean   11891.87 9849.937 14006.65*** 15330.36 226.88 
      
Standard 
deviation 10274.73 
7270.531 14087.53 17425.04 114.06 
      
Max 86896.84 39227.35 86896.84 136897.3 463 
      
Min 382.21 311 417 179.79 4 
      
25% 6470.96 4743.48 6759.23 5801.35 139 
      
50% 9289.67 8420.43 10690.15 10487.52 221.5 
      
75% 14248.38 11590.36 15673.35 20235.35 318 
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Table 3-B Descriptive statistics for quality of directors 
 
 The ongoing CEOs on boards The retired CEOs on boards
Number of observations 236 251 
   
Mean   9683.26 13760.29*** 
   
Standard deviation 7689.18 16252.02 
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 Table 4 How the average quality of boards depends on characteristics of firms  
•       Dependent variable: the quality of other firms’ ongoing  CEOs and retired CEOs as  
             outside directors on board in 2005 
• Proxy for quality: The natural log value of the CEO compensations, averaged over 
ongoing CEOs plus retired CEOs as outside directors on boards 
• All independent variables are the natural log value in 2004  
• The standard error is in parenthesis 
 
 
OLS with 
logvalue/robust 
standard error 
OLS with 
logvalue/robust 
standard error 
OLS with 
logvalue/robust 
standard error 
Ln(CEO 
compensation)  
.10 
( .067) 
.116* 
(.066) 
    
Ln(Market 
capitalization)  
-.03 
( .106) 
-.051 
(.112) 
.004 
( .131) 
    
Ln(Total 
assets) 
.051 
( .099) 
.043 
( .10) 
.003 
( .121) 
    
Ln(Sale)  .258*** ( .082) 
.253*** 
( .083) 
.225*** 
( .084) 
    
Ln(Anndir) .156 (.163) 
.141 
( .164) 
.17 
( .126) 
    
Market to 
book ratio   
.005 
( .009) 
    
Long term 
debt/total 
assets 
  .469 ( .431) 
    
Constant  5.811*** ( .697) 
5.242*** 
( .832) 
4.994*** 
( .84) 
    
R-squared 0.1124 0.1187 0.1197 
    
N 188 188 179 
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 Table 5 How the average quality of boards depends on characteristics of firms  
•       Dependent variable: the quality of other firms’ ongoing  CEOs and retired CEOs as  
             outside directors on board in 2005 
• Proxy for quality: The natural log value of the market capitalization, averaged over 
ongoing CEOs plus retired CEOs as outside directors on boards 
• All independent variables are the natural log value in 2004 
• The standard error is in parenthesis 
 
 
OLS with 
logvalue/robust 
standard error 
OLS with 
logvalue/robust 
standard error 
OLS with 
logvalue/robust 
standard error 
Ln(CEO 
compensation) 
 .261**    
(.126) 
  .138    
(.137) 
    
Ln(Market 
capitalization)  
.531***  
 ( .227) 
.538**   
( .225) 
.66***   
( .243)   
    
Ln(Total assets) -.163    (.219) 
-.231   
( .205) 
-.308   
( .231) 
    
Ln(Sale)  .221   ( .165) 
.193   
( .177) 
.278    
( .17) 
    
Ln(Anndir) .226   ( .274) 
.154 
  ( .233) 
  .168   
( .185) 
    
Market to book 
ratio 
  .013   ( .012)   
    
Long term 
debt/total assets 
  .703   ( .742) 
    
Constant  3.454    (1.347) 
2.226    
(1.352) 
  1.696    
(1.528) 
    
R-squared 0.1633 0.1798 0.1931 
    
N 203 203 194 
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 Table 6 Sample distribution of newly joined outside directors 
•      I  download 2001-2005 board profiles of U.S firms which have total asset values       
            greater than $ 1,000 million in 2004 from IRRC data base 
•     I  select ongoing CEOs who newly join boards as outside directors during 2000-2005 
•     Proxy for quality:  total compensation level as CEOs one year before joining boards  
•     The converted quality: I convert the quality measure into 2004 year value. For   
                 instance, if A ongoing CEO joins the boards in 2001, his quality is measured by (CEO  
                 compensation in 2000)*(1+the median growth rate of CEO compensation between  
                 2000 and 2004)  
•      All values are mean values ($ thousand) 
 
 
 
Joining 
year N 
The converted 
quality:  total 
compensations 
as CEOs 
1995 15 9499.27 
   
1996 28 8872.37 
   
1997 31 9017.83 
   
1998 24 10761.86 
   
1999 41 11024.35 
   
2000 35 12455.85 
   
2001 61 9716.44 
   
2002 35 7487.426 
   
2003 83 7951.995 
   
2004 67 7507.653 
   
2005 27 5377.355 
   
Total 339 8636.49 
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Table 7-A How the quality of newly joined director i depends on characteristics of firm 
j: Ongoing CEO Directors only  
• I  download 2001-2005 board profiles of U.S firms which have total asset values             
greater than $ 1,000 million in 2004 from IRRC data base 
• I  select ongoing CEOs who newly join boards as outside directors during 2000-2005 
• Dependent variable: the quality of other firms’ ongoing  CEOs  
• Proxy for quality:  The natural log value of total compensation level as CEOs one year 
before joining boards    
 
 OLS with logvalue 
OLS with 
logvalue 
OLS with  
logvalue 
Ln(CEO 
compensation)  
  .194**   
(.084) 
.199**    
(.087)   
    
Ln(Market 
capitalization)  
.31**   
( .129) 
.24*   
( .131) 
.271    
(.17) 
    
Ln(Total assets) -.131    ( .111) 
-.099    
(.111) 
-.117    
(.142) 
    
Ln(Sale)  .1   ( .097) 
.069    
( .097) 
.05    
(.104) 
    
Ln(Anndir) .085    ( .164) 
.033   
( .164) 
.009   
(.173) 
    
Market to book ratio   .0003   ( .03) 
    
Long term debt/total 
assets   
  -.09    
( .423) 
    
Constant  5.589***   (.551) 
4.706***    
(.666) 
4.809***   
(  .713) 
    
R-squared 0.2032 0.2248 0.2176 
    
N 197 197 191 
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Table 7-B How the quality of newly joined director i depends on characteristics of firm 
j: Ongoing CEO Directors only  
• I  download 2001-2005 board profiles of U.S firms which have total asset values             
greater than $ 1,000 million in 2004 from IRRC data base 
• I  select ongoing CEOs who newly join boards as outside directors during 2000-2005 
• Dependent variable: the quality of other firms’ ongoing  CEOs  
• Proxy for quality:  The natural log value of the market capitalization 
 
 OLS with logvalue 
OLS with 
logvalue 
OLS with 
logvalue 
2SLS with 
logvalue 
Ln(CEO 
compensation)  
.256**   
( .12) 
.256**    
(.122) 
  .021    
(.791)  
     
Ln(Market 
capitalization)  
  .689***   
(.189) 
.59***   
( .193) 
.656***   
(.212) 
.686**    
(.299) 
     
Ln(Total assets) -.287*   ( .16)   
-.246   
( .16)   
-.255    
(.173)   
-.254       
(.182) 
     
Ln(Sale)  .259*   ( .141)   
.223    
(.141) 
.169    
(.148) 
.232   
( .205) 
     
Ln(Anndir) -.237   ( .242) 
-.306   
( .243) 
-.343   
( .251) 
-.283   
( .33) 
     
Market to book 
ratio   
.018*   
( .009) 
.017*    
(.01) 
     
Long term 
debt/total assets   
.885    
(.666) 
.841    
( .686) 
     
Constant  3.489***    (.777) 
  2.386**   
(.928) 
2.21**   
( .986) 
3.22   
( 3.528) 
     
R-squared 0.2840 0.2962 0.3006 0.2928 
     
N 270 270 262 262 
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Table 8 Regression of the CEO compensations on board quality (OLS and 2SLS) 
• The dependent variable: The CEO compensations (TDC1) in 2005  
• All independent variables are the values in 2004 except tenure as CEOs and Board 
structure variables 
• The board quality: the averaged quality of other firms’ ongoing  CEOs and retired CEOs 
as outside directors on boards in 2005 
• The proxy for the board quality is the averaged compensation level as CEOs over 
ongoing and retired CEOs on boards in 2005, which is  used in Table 4  
• The instrument for the board quality is the board compensation (annual director fee) 
 
 OLS with logvalue 2SLS 
Ln(Market capitalization) -.364   ( .22) 
-.286 
( .215) 
   
Ln(Asset) .561**   ( .224) 
.513** 
( .22) 
   
Ln(Sale)  .061    ( .099)   
-.107 
( .219) 
   
ROA .035*    (.018) 
.056 
( .018) 
   
Debt/Asset -1.11**    (.523) 
-1.103** 
(.541) 
   
Market to book ratio .062**   ( .026)   
.004 
( .014) 
   
Ln(Tenure as CEOs) .207***    (.075) 
.274*** 
( .104) 
   
Board structures   
   
CEOCBO .035   ( .152) 
-.038 
(.194) 
   
The quality of boards .164**    (.077) 
.604 
( .753) 
   
The size of boards .061   ( .363) 
.220 
( .52) 
   
The proportion of outside directors .28   ( .781) 
.192 
( .944) 
   
Constant    4.342***    (1.266)   
1.351 
   (5.42) 
   
R-squared 0.3039 0.2147 
   
N 161 161 
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Table 9 Descriptive statistics for the board compensations  
•        I  download the board compensations data of U.S firms which have total asset    
              values greater than $ 5,000 million in 2005  
• The board compensations: annual director fees in 2005 
• All values are in $ thousand 
 
 The board compensations ($thousand) 
N 466 
  
Mean   46.6 
  
Standard deviation 20.64 
  
Max 200 
  
Min 6 
  
25% 30 
  
50% 45 
  
75% 60 
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Table 10 The compensation for outside directors (Annual director fee): Cross-section 
data      
• I  download financial information of U.S firms which have total asset values       
             greater than $ 5,000 million in 2005  
• Dependent variable: the annual director fee in 2005 year  
• Independent variables are the characteristics of firms  
• All values are 2004 year values 
 
 OLS with logvalue/ robust standard error 
Quantile 
regression (.25) 
Median quantile 
regression 
Quantile 
regression (.75) 
Asset -.01 (.05) 
  .007   
 (.104) 
-.032   
( .058) 
-.108*  
( .06)     
     
Sale  .66*** (.14) 
.926***   
( .24) 
.704***   
( .132)   
.399***    
(.139) 
     
Sale*Sale -.03*** (.008) 
-.044***   
( .013) 
-.029***   
( .007) 
  -.013*     
( .008) 
     
Market capitalization   .001 (.05) 
   .008   
( .109) 
.026   
( .060) 
.084   
( .062)   
     
CEO compensation 
(TDC1) 
.13*** 
(.03) 
.129***   
( .045) 
.099***   
( .025) 
  .12***   
  ( .027) 
     
ROA -.0003 (.004) 
-.0002  
( .007) 
.004    
( .004) 
-.002   
( .004) 
     
Constant  -.88 (.67) 
-2.42**   
( 1.122) 
-.911   
( .627) 
.682   
( .659) 
     
R-squared 0.3999    
     
Pseudo R-squared  0.2303 0.2305 0.2101 
     
N 448 448 448 448 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
